Abstract
Introduction
Notwithstanding the fact that the concept of "market abuse" is not statutorily and expressly defined in a number of jurisdictions globally, 1 the aforesaid concept shall be employed as a generic term referring to both insider trading and market manipulation 2 in this article. Notably, market abuse-related challenges have occurred in several financial markets globally. 3 South Africa is no exception. 4 For instance, it is submitted that market abuse practices were rampantly occurring in the South African financial markets in the mid 1990s. 5 Over and above, although South Africa had antimarket abuse legislation in place since the late 1990s, the enforcement of such legislation has been inconsistent to date. 6 It is against this background that this article analyses the use of selected and available remedies for market abuse victims as stipulated in the Financial Markets Act 7 in order to investigate the adequacy of such remedies as regards the affording of adequate damages to the affected persons and the combating of market abuse practices in South Africa. To this end, the article provides an overview analysis of compensatory damages, administrative damages and actual calculable damages that are employed under the Financial Markets Act in a bid to provide appropriate and equitable redress to the victims of market abuse practices in South Africa. Moreover, where possible, the article will also provide a comparative analysis of these remedies and those that were provided under the Securities Services Act. 8 This is done to examine whether the market abuse remedies that were re-introduced under the Financial Markets Act have now adequately resolved the flaws and gaps that were associated with similar remedies under the former Act. This is further done to recommend, where possible, other measures that can be employed to combat such flaws in South Africa. In order to achieve this, the article will, firstly, provide the definition of selected key terms and concepts. Secondly, the available market abuse remedies under the Financial Markets Act will be outlined. Thirdly, the adequacy of the available market abuse remedies under the Financial Markets Act will be discussed. Fourthly, an overview comparative analysis of the market abuse remedies that were given under the Securities Services Act and those that are available under the Financial Markets Act will be provided. Lastly, possible measures that can be employed to combat market abuse in South Africa will be recommended, and some concluding remarks will be provided.
The Definition of Selected Key Terms and Concepts

The Concept of Market Abuse
Market abuse is a very difficult concept to define. As earlier stated, 9 there is no comprehensive and satisfactory definition of this concept that exists to date. 10 Market abuse involves the misuse of material information (price-sensitive information), the dissemination of false or misleading information and practices which abnormally or artificially affect, or are likely to affect, the formation of prices or volumes of trading of financial instruments. 11 This definition is nonetheless narrowly limited to market manipulation by way of misuse of price-sensitive information and engaging in prohibited trading practices. It does not clearly state or define insider trading as another form of "market abuse". Thus, although the Johannesburg Stock Exchange" 1987 South African Journal of Business Management 198 201-202; Osode "The Regulation of Insider Trading in South Africa: A Public Choice Perspective" 1999 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 688 690-695; Van Deventer "New watchdog for insider trading" 1999 FSB Bulletin 2 3; the King Task Group Minority Report paragraph 3.4 as summarised in Beuthin & Luiz Beuthin's Basic Company Law (2000) Effective, Competitive and Adequate Regulatory Statutory Framework (LLM Dissertation University of Fort Hare 2008) , . Also see further Jooste "Insider Trading: A New Clamp-Down" 1991 BML 248 248-250;  Bill of 1990 B 119-90 (GA) ; the Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Second Amendment Bill of 1989 B 99-89 (GA) ; Botha "Control of Insider Trading in South Africa: A Comparative Analysis" 1991 SA Merc LJ 1 4-6; Van der Lingen "Tougher Legislation to Combat Insider Trading" 1997 FSB Bulletin 10; Luiz "Insider Trading Regulation -If at First You Don't Succeed…" 1999 SA Merc LJ 136 139-145; Jooste R "Insider Dealing in South Africa-The Criminal Aspects" 1990 De Ratione 21 21-28; Botha D "Increased Maximum Fine for Insider Trading: A Realistic and Effective Deterrent?" 1990 SALJ 504 504-508 Com (1999 Com ( ) 232" (2008 Com ( ) <http://www.europefesco.org> (accessed10-05-2013 , for further analysis.
235-238; see generally Chitimira The Regulation of Insider Trading in South Africa: A Roadmap for an
the Explanatory Memorandum to the Objects of the Companies Second Amendment
European Union Directive on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation 12 generally uses the term "market abuse" to refer to transaction and/or trade-based market manipulation as well as disclosure and/or information-based market manipulation and insider trading, it does not expressly define the concept of market abuse to cover all these forms of prohibited trading practices. Moreover, the concept of market abuse is not defined in the United States of America. However, in the Cargil Inc v Hardin case 13 market abuse was defined as an act involving market manipulation or any activity, scheme or artifice that deliberately influences the price of a financial asset, resulting in a price other than the one that would have resulted in the absence of such intervention. This definition is once again narrow and does not expressly apply to insider trading and hence it has attracted similar criticisms from some scholars. 14 Despite these definitional deficiencies, all the forms of market manipulation and insider trading are generally treated as "market abuse" in the United States of America.
The same approach was adopted in the United Kingdom, where the concept of market abuse was widely defined as behaviour, whether by one person alone or by two or more persons jointly or in concert, which occurs in relation to qualifying investments traded or admitted to trading on a prescribed market or in respect of which a request for admission to trading on such a market has been made and which falls within any one or more types of prohibited behaviour set out under the Financial Services and Markets Act. 15 The term "market abuse" is broadly used to refer to a number illegal practices like insider trading, improper disclosure, misuse of information, manipulating transactions, manipulating devices, dissemination and distortion and misleading behaviour. 16 Notwithstanding the fact that these practices are different from each other, the use of the generic term "market abuse" has reduced confusion to a certain extent and enhanced the enforcement of market abuse prohibition in the United Kingdom. 17 Similarly, in South Africa and for the purposes of this article, as earlier stated, 18 the term "market abuse" is used as a generic term referring to insider trading, prohibited trading practices (trade-based market manipulation) and the making or publication of false, misleading or deceptive promises, statements or forecasts (disclosure-based market manipulation). 19 Therefore, although the Financial Markets Act does not expressly define the concept of market abuse, this article employs the term "market abuse" to refer to all the forms of market manipulation and insider trading as outlawed in the Financial Markets Act and other jurisdictions such as the United States of America, Australia, the United Kingdom and the European Union for consistency and eradication of unnecessary confusion. As noted above, market abuse is not expressly defined in the Financial Markets Act. However, a number of practices that could give rise to criminal and civil liability for market abuse are merely stated in the Financial Markets Act. 20 For instance, three forms of market abuse, namely insider trading, trade-based market manipulation and disclosure-based market manipulation relating to listed securities are prohibited under the Financial Markets Act. This status quo was directly borrowed from the Securities Services Act 21 without any useful changes and/or definitions of the concepts of insider trading, 22 market manipulation 23 or market abuse. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that insider trading is specifically prohibited in the Financial Markets Act; 24 it is still not expressly defined in this Act. For instance, any person who knew that he or she had Parliament and Council of 28 January 2003 , on Insider Dealing and Manipulation (Market Abuse) 2003 /6/EC OJ 2003 . Also see Ferrarini "The European Market Abuse Directive" 2004 Common Market Law Review 711 724-728. 13 (1971) 452 F2d 1154 1163; 1167-1170. 14 Easterbrook "Monopoly, Manipulation and the Regulation of Futures Markets" 1986 J Bus S 102 102-127 Regulation (2006) 29-33; 205. 16 Swan Market Abuse Regulation 205-206; Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing and Market Abuse (2009) 130-139; Rider B et al Market Abuse and Insider Dealing (2009) [72] [73] . 17 See paragraph 1 above. 19 See ss 77; 78; 80; 81 and 82 and other relevant provisions in Chapter X entitled "Market Abuse" of the Financial Markets Act. 20 See ss 78; 80; 81 and 82. 21 See ss 73; 75; 76 and 77. 22 non-public price-sensitive information and who improperly disclosed it or encouraged or discouraged another person from dealing or who dealt directly or indirectly for his or her benefit or for the benefit of any other person in securities to which such information relates or where the price of such securities was likely to be affected by such dealing will incur criminal or civil liability for insider trading. 25 The same practices were also outlawed in the Securities Services Act 26 and later reintroduced in the Financial Markets Act 27 without providing any new insider trading-related definitions or offences such as an "attempted insider trading offence" and/or a specific "tipping" offence.
See article 1(2)(a)-(c) of the Directive of the European
Likewise, trade-based market manipulation is further prohibited in the Financial Markets Act but it is not expressly defined in this Act. 28 Examples of activities that amounts to, or that are deemed to be manipulative include executing a transaction with no beneficial change of ownership of the securities and entering orders into the market near the close of the market or during the auctioning process for the purpose of creating a deceptive appearance in that market. 29 The same approach was employed in the Securities Services Act 30 and accordingly, similar conduct that amounts to, or that may be deemed to constitute trade-based market manipulation is also outlawed in the Financial Markets Act. 31 Moreover, disclosure-based market manipulation is also prohibited in the Financial Markets Act but it has not been expressly defined under this Act. 32 This prohibition on the making or publication of false, misleading or deceptive statements, promises and forecasts can be welcomed because such information often distorts the market price of securities, giving rise to direct or indirect prejudice to innocent market participants. The same practices were recycled from and/or prohibited in the Securities Services Act, 33 but nonetheless Internet-related manipulative disclosures are still not expressly outlawed in the Financial Markets Act. 34 Notwithstanding the fact that the Financial Markets Act was enacted as a separate piece of legislation that consolidates all previous market abuse provisions of the Securities Services Act, the regulation and enforcement of the market abuse ban and/or the affording of adequate market abuse remedies to the actual affected persons in South Africa have remained scant and inconsistent to date. 35 This could have been, inter alia, aggravated by the fact that it would only amount to market abuse if the accused person knew that he contravened, directly or indirectly, the relevant provisions of the Financial Markets Act. This suggests that the knowledge of the market abuse offence in question is required on the part of the offenders before any liability can be imputed on them. Nonetheless, the Financial Markets Act, like the Securities Services Act, 36 does not provide adequate definitions of the aforementioned key terms and/or presumptions which could be used to enhance the prosecution of market abuse cases in South Africa. 37 It is suggested that enacting a statutory provision for a definition of the concept of "market abuse" involving all the elements of this offence (how it is committed), many types of market abuse and presumptions could improve the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa. 38 Moreover, notwithstanding the difficulties that might have been encountered in relation to factors like repetition of same provisions, double jeopardy and over-criminalisation of market abuse practices in different statutes, the mere consolidation of the Securities Services Act's market abuse provisions into the Financial Markets Act on its own did not sufficiently provide appropriate and equitable redress or remedies to the victims of market abuse practices in South Africa. 39
The Meaning of Remedies
Remedies are generally defined to include the manner in which a right is enforced or satisfied by a court when some Van Deventer (10-06-2008) 1-4, available at <http://www.fsb.co.za/public/marketabuse/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 05-05-2013 Van Deventer (10-06-2008) 1-4, available at <http://www.fsb.co.za/public/marketabuse/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 05-05-2013). harm or injury, that is known or recognised by the society as a wrongful act, is inflicted upon an individual by other persons intentionally or unintentionally. 40 Accordingly, remedies are usually concerned with the nature and extent of relief to which the affected person is entitled to receive either from the courts (including the relevant enforcement authorities) or directly from the defendant, once he or she has proved that he or she was prejudiced by the actions, conduct or dealings of that defendant. There are generally four main types of judicial remedies that a prejudiced person may claim against the offenders, namely damages; restitution; coercive remedies and declaratory remedies. 41 For the purposes of this article, two main types of damages, namely, compensatory damages and punitive damages will be briefly defined and/or discussed here. Firstly, compensatory damages can be defined to include any kind of relief that is intended to compensate the injured or affected party for the harm he or she might have suffered as a result of the actions, conduct or dealings of another person. 42 Compensatory damages are, in most instances, awarded to the affected party as a monetary amount equivalent to value and/or profit made or loss avoided by the defendant. 43 Secondly, punitive damages are mainly imposed upon the defendant in order to punish or deter him or her from committing certain prohibited practices, rather than to compensate the affected party.
With regard to restitution, it should be noted that restitutive remedies are mainly aimed at restoring the plaintiff or the affected party to the position he or she was before he or she was prejudiced by the defendant. 44 Restitutive remedies are mostly measured by the defendant's gains, as opposed to the affected party's losses. Consequently, in order to prevent the defendant from being unjustly enriched by the wrong or market abuse practices, restitutive remedies such as the recovery of property or disgorgement of profits and pecuniary penalties may be imposed against the defendant.
Likewise, coercive remedies are court orders imposed against the defendant to force him or her to do, or refrain from doing, something that will negatively affect other persons. 45 Coercive remedies may include other administrative remedies such as injunctions; order for specific performance; cease and desist orders; mandatory orders; order for the freezing of assets and public censure (name and shaming).
On the hand, declaratory remedies are available to the plaintiff when he or she wishes to be made aware or advised on matters regarding to the position of the law, in order that he or she may be able to take the appropriate action against the defendant. 46 Notably, for the purposes of this article damages; restitutive and coercive remedies such as compensatory damages, administrative damages and actual calculable damages that are employed under the Financial Markets Act 47 will be discussed. This is done to establish whether these damages are appropriate and/or able to give equitable 48 redress to the victims of market abuse practices in South Africa.
40 Burton WC "Burton's Legal Thesaurus" (2007 ) <http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/remedy> (accessed 21-10-2013 , for related analysis; also see Brown "SEC Civil Remedies for Insider Trading Actions under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5" 1988 Cincinnati Law Review 679 679-698. 41 See Burton (2007 Burton ( ), available at <http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/remedy> (accessed 21-10-2013 , for related analysis. 42 See Burton (2007 Burton ( ), available at <http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/remedy> (accessed 21-10-2013 Burton (2007 Burton ( ), available at <http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/remedy> (accessed 21-10-2013 , for related analysis; also see the Gale Group Incorporated (2008 ), available at <http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/remedy> (accessed 21-10-2013 , for a related discussion.
The Meaning of Damages
Damages may be broadly defined to include any measures aimed at providing some relief 49 to the plaintiff or the person affected by the offender or defendant's actions, conduct or dealings. 50 In light of this, it is submitted that damages should not be merely referred and/or limited to the costs or expenses incurred by the plaintiff when he or she instituted some legal proceedings against the defendant. There are generally three main types of damages, namely, compensatory damages, 51 nominal damages 52 and punitive damages. 53 In certain situations, two other forms of damages, namely, treble 54 and liquidated 55 damages may be imposed against the offenders. However, as stated earlier, 56 this article will mainly focus on compensatory damages, administrative damages and actual calculable damages that are employed under the Financial Markets Act. 57
The Available Market Abuse Remedies under the Financial Markets Act
A relatively few remedies are available to the market abuse victims under the Financial Markets Act. 58 For instance, after a matter is lodged with the FSB and later referred to the EC, the EC may impose against the market abuse offender, an administrative sanction not exceeding the profit made or loss avoided by that offender. 59 This suggests that the Financial Markets Act provides some administrative damages which may be awarded to the persons affected by market abuse offences, especially insider trading. 60 Apart from administrative damages, the Financial Markets Act also provides compensatory damages to the market abuse victims. 61 Precisely, any person affected by insider trading activities may claim part of the proceeds or the available R1 million 62 compensatory damages from the FSB. 63 Furthermore, any person affected by insider trading may claim part of the treble damages proceeds, namely a compensatory amount that is up to three times the profit made or loss avoided by the offender from the FSB after it has recouped its costs. 64 Insider trading victims may also recover part of the proceeds obtained from the offenders by the FSB, in respect of any interests, investigation costs, legal costs and Burton (2007 Burton ( ), available at <http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/remedy> (accessed 21-10-2013 , for related analysis; also see the Gale Group Incorporated (2008 ), available at <http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/remedy> (accessed 21-10-2013 
Such relief is usually awarded to the plaintiff as monetary compensatory damages to the extent of the loss that he or
)(a); (2)(a). 60 See s 82(1)(a); (2)(a). 61 See s 82(1)(b); (2)(b). 62 Notably, this amount must be annually reviewed by the Registrar of Securities Services to ensure that it is consistent with the Consumer Price Index as published by the Statistics South Africa. See s 82(1)(b); (2)(b). 63 See s 82(1)(b); (2)(b). 64 See s 82(1)(b); (2)(b).
commission 65 as determined by the EC. 66 The Financial Markets Act further provides actual calculable damages which may be utilised by those who fall victim to insider trading practices. 67 Accordingly, any person prejudiced by insider trading may, (a) claim an amount equal to the difference between the price at which that person dealt and the price (as determined by the EC) that he or she might have dealt at if the inside information had been published at the time of dealing. 68 Likewise, any person prejudiced by insider trading may (b) claim an amount equal to the pro rata portion of the balance of R1 million plus three times the profit made or loss avoided by the offender, calculable with regard to the amount contemplated in paragraph (a) above, 69 and/or other amounts proved by the affected person, whichever is the lesser. 70 Now that the market abuse remedies as enumerated in the Financial Markets Act have been discussed, one question which could be asked is whether or not the aforementioned remedies are sufficient and/or robust enough to combat market abuse in South Africa. Therefore, in order to address this and other concerns, a related analysis will be undertaken in the next sub-heading.
The Adequacy of Available Market Abuse Remedies under the Financial Markets Act
The available market abuse remedies under the Financial Markets Act are only limited to insider trading cases. 71 This could suggest that there are no statutory remedies available to the persons affected by other market abuse offences such as market manipulation under the Financial Markets Act. 72 Consequently, it is submitted that these remedies are still very few 73 and/or less dissuasive for the purposes of combating market abuse practices in the South African financial markets and elsewhere 74 consistently. For instance, other market abuse remedies such as private rights of action, specific civil pecuniary penalties, punitive damages and class actions are not provided in the Financial Markets Act. 75 Moreover, any persons affected by insider trading will only get their compensatory damages after the FSB has recouped its expenses in relation to any successful settlements involving insider trading cases. 76 Consequently, the balance, if any, will only be paid to successful claimants. 77 This could imply that not all the affected persons will timeously receive their adequate insider trading damages either because such damages would have been completely consumed by the FSB costs or severely reduced by the recouped costs of the FSB. 78 Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact that the civil compensatory damages instituted through the FSB could conserve government resources and/or help the claimants to avoid private litigation costs, settling with the FSB alone could, if not properly enforced, give rise to bureaucracy and/or delays on the part of the insider trading victims to prove Regime -Overview" (2011 ) 1-60 <http://www.slaughterandmay.com> (accessed 24-10-2013 Dominance: Policy Brief" (2008 ) 1-8 <www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/17/38623413.pdf> (accessed 24-10-2013 their claims and receive adequate compensatory damages from the FSB timeously. Over and above, it remains somewhat difficult for the claimants to objectively prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they were affected by the insider trading offence in question because there are no statutory guidelines on how a claims officer may exercise his or her discretion to determine whether such claimants were actually affected. 79 It is noted that civil compensatory damages may increases deterrence due to the higher probability of different civil sanctions that could be imposed on the market abuse offenders. 80 Nonetheless, it is submitted that overreliance on civil compensatory damages alone could be less deterrent. 81 Consequently, other remedies such as private rights of action, 82 specific civil pecuniary penalties, punitive damages and class actions 83 should be considered to ensure that all the affected persons are given adequate and equitable market abuse remedies in the future.
See s 82)(2)(e). 66 See s 82(1)(c) and (d); (2)(c) and (d). 67 See s 82(6)(a). 68 The amount for actual calculable damages is determined by the EC having regard to the differences or changes in the price of the affected securities. See s 82(6)(a). 69 See s 82(6)(a). 70 See s 82(6)(b). Be that as it may, the claims officer has the discretion to determine whether or not the affected person should receive a lesser or no amount for actual calculable damages. 71 See s 82. 72 Thus, unlike other jurisdictions such as the United States of America ("the USA"), the United Kingdom ("the UK"), Australia and the European Union ("the EU"), persons affected by market manipulation may not statutorily recover their damages from the offenders in terms of the Financial Markets Act. Also see Easterbrook & Fischel "Optimal Damages in Securities Cases" 1985 The University of Chicago Law Review 611 611-652; Slaughter & May "The EU/UK Market Abuse
and The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("the OECD") "Remedies and Sanctions for Abuse of Market
It is, however, important to note that those who fall victims to market abuse practices may rely on any available and applicable common law remedies. 84 This further suggest that although there are no market abuse remedies that are expressly and statutorily available to those who are prejudiced by market manipulation activities under the Financial Markets Act, 85 such persons may, however, rely on the applicable common law remedies. Nevertheless, a claimant who successfully obtained any amount of common law damages 86 will have such amount deducted from the amount that he or she might have claimed in terms of the Financial Markets Act. 87 Given the analysis above, the next sub-heading will now provide an overview comparative analysis of the market abuse remedies that were given under the Securities Services Act and those that are available under the Financial Markets Act. This is done to examine whether the market abuse remedies that were re-introduced under the Financial Markets Act, as indicated above, have now adequately resolved the flaws and gaps that were associated with similar remedies under the Securities Services Act.
Overview Comparative Analysis of the Available Market Abuse Remedies under the Financial Markets Act and the Securities Services Act
The Financial Markets Act 88 re-introduced most of the market abuse remedies that were initially incorporated in the Securities Services Act. 89 For instance, the EC may impose against the market abuse offender, an administrative sanction not exceeding the profit made or loss avoided by that offender. 90 This provision was recycled from the Securities Services Act without providing any new administrative damages that could be utilised by those affected by market abuse practices in South Africa or elsewhere. 91 Moreover, the Financial Markets Act also provides compensatory damages for an amount of up to three times the profit made or loss avoided by the offender, 92 to those prejudiced by market abuse practices. This status quo was directly Duan 2009 , for further related analysis. 83 Duan 2009 Duquesne Business LJ 148; 152-154 & Chitimira & Lawack 2012Obiter 560-562, for Africa. Nonetheless, as it was under the Securities Services Act, 118 other alternative market abuse remedies such as specific civil pecuniary penalties, punitive damages, class actions and private rights of action are still not considered under the Financial Markets Act. 119 As earlier indicated, 120 any persons affected by insider trading will only get their compensatory damages after the FSB has recouped its expenses in relation to any successful settlements involving insider trading cases. 121 This could further suggest, as was the position under the Securities Services Act, 122 that not all the affected persons will get their adequate insider trading damages because such damages might still be reduced or completely consumed by the FSB's recouped costs in terms of the Financial Markets Act. 123 As indicated above, one could argue that the market abuse remedies that were re-introduced under the Financial Markets Act have, to a great extent, not been able to adequately resolve the flaws and gaps that were associated with similar remedies under the Securities Services Act.
Concluding Remarks
The article has provided an overview analysis of compensatory damages, administrative damages and actual calculable damages that are employed under the Financial Markets Act in a bid to provide appropriate and equitable redress to the victims of market abuse practices in South Africa. 124 In relation to this, it is was noted that these market abuse remedies are still very few and/or less dissuasive for the purposes of combating market abuse practices in the South African financial markets and elsewhere consistently. 125 For instance, other market abuse remedies such as private rights of action, specific civil pecuniary penalties, punitive damages and class actions are not expressly provided in the Financial Markets Act. 126 Accordingly, it is submitted that the Financial Markets Act should be amended to expressly provide for the aforementioned remedies and other coercive market abuse remedies such as injunctions; specific performance orders; cease and desist orders; mandatory orders; order for the freezing of assets and name and shaming. 127 Furthermore, it was revealed that apart from common law remedies, there are no statutory remedies available to the persons affected by other market abuse offences such as market manipulation under the Financial Markets Act. 128 In light of this, it is hoped that the Financial Markets Act will be reviewed to enact adequate market abuse remedies that will be applicable to both the insider trading and market manipulation victims.
The article further provided an overview comparative analysis of the market abuse remedies that were given under the Securities Services Act and those that are available under the Financial Markets Act. 129 Nonetheless, it was indicated that the Financial Markets Act recycled most of the market abuse-related flaws that were previously embedded in the Securities Services Act. 130 For example, as was the position under the Securities Services Act, Internet-related manipulative disclosures are still not expressly outlawed in the Financial Markets Act. 131 In this regard, it is submitted that the Financial Markets Act should be amended to enact provisions that expressly prohibit Internet-related market manipulation practices and provide sufficient remedies to those prejudiced by such practices. It was also highlighted that the market abuse practices which were previously outlawed in Securities Services Act were re-introduced in the Financial Markets Act 132 without providing any new insider trading-related definitions or offences such as an "attempted insider trading offence" and/or a specific "tipping" offence. Consequently, it is suggested that the Financial Markets Act should be amended to enact additional provisions for new market abuse-related definitions and/or offences such as an "attempted insider trading offence", "attempted market manipulation offence" and a specific "tipping" offence. See ss 78; 82; 80 and 81. as highlighted earlier, 133 that enacting a statutory provision in the Financial Markets Act for a definition of the concept of "market abuse" involving all the elements of this offence (how it is committed), many types of market abuse and presumptions could improve the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa.
Furthermore, it was stated that settling market abuse cases with the FSB alone could, if not properly enforced, give rise to bureaucracy and/or delays on the part of the insider trading victims to prove their claims and receive adequate compensatory damages from the FSB timeously. 134 It is, therefore, hoped that the Financial Markets Act will be reviewed in the future to expressly provide for other alternative anti-market abuse measures and remedies such as private rights of action and class actions to enable all the affected persons to directly and timeously claim their damages from the offenders. It is further submitted that the policy makers should consider amending the Financial Markets Act to enact specific statutory provisions and/or guidelines that could be employed by a claims officer when exercising his or her discretion to determine the actual calculable market abuse damages that will be paid to successful claimants. 135 In a nutshell, the article has revealed that the market abuse remedies stipulated in the Financial Markets Act are still very few and/or less dissuasive for the purposes of combating market abuse practices in South Africa consistently. Moreover, given the fact that the Financial Market Act's market abuse provisions recycled some of the flaws previously contained in the Securities Services Act, it remains questionable whether the Financial Markets Act's market abuse prohibition will enhance the combating of market abuse in South Africa. Accordingly, it is hoped that the recommendations as enumerated in this article will be utilised by the relevant stakeholders in the future to enhance the combating of market abuse activities in South Africa. In relation to this, other academics are further encouraged to conduct more legal research on anti-market abuse measures and remedies as well as the challenges associated and/or faced by market abuse victims in order to increase awareness on the part of the general public, policy makers and other relevant stakeholders and to innovate possible solutions that could be employed to enhance the enforcement of the market abuse ban in South Africa.
